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Abstract

This article explores the interaction between local and international power structures in EU peacebuilding. While citizens in a state only face order from one authority (the state), local actors in a peacebuilding context are subject to orders from two institutions (the domestic state and the peacebuilding mission). This article explores the nature of interactions of these two institutions and their effect on local police officers’ compliance and resistance. Specifically, it analyzes the example of the police restructuring process in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It demonstrates that the choices of local officers to comply or resist depended on whether the interactions between the EU Police Mission and the local police organization were positive and mutually supportive, or whether they were competitive and contradictory. The findings of the article contribute to the debates on the role of local power and the importance of local legitimacy in peacebuilding. 
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The past couple of years have witnessed a turn of the international peacebuilding literature toward including “local” perspectives. As highlighted in the introduction to this special issue (Juncos & Ejdus, 2017), this “local turn” has brought attention to the agency and power of local actors, particularly through the concepts of local legitimacy, resistance, and ownership (Lemay-Hebert, 2014; Mac Ginty, 2011; Von Billerbeck, 2016; Whalan, 2013). This turn has also raised new pertinent questions: chiefly the interaction between local and international actors and powers in peacebuilding. Various aspects of this interaction have been discussed in the recent literature. These include strategic interaction (Kahler, 2008; Barnett & Zürcher, 2008), the role of culture (Duffey, 2000; Rubinstein, 2005; Rubinstein, Keller & Scherger, 2008), hybridity (Mac Ginty, 2011; Mac Ginty & Sanghera, 2012; Peterson, 2012; Visoka, 2012), and friction (Björkdahl & Höglund, 2013; Millar, Van der Lijn, & Verkoren, 2013).
A criticism within the local turn is its blindness to power in general and local power in particular (Paffenholz, 2015; Sending, 2011). This article addresses this gap as it takes the duality of power structures within peacebuilding and its consequences as the starting point for analysis. It hence approaches the question of interaction from the perspective of the power literature in international relations and political science. In these literatures, the power of the state over its citizens is most commonly divided into three analytically separate power mechanisms: coercion, inducement, and legitimacy (Boulding, 1989; Hurd, 2007; Tyler, 1990; Weber, 1978). The same power mechanisms are also relevant for international peacebuilding operations, which constitute institutions of authority for local actors due to the powers imbued in their mandates. 
However, while citizens in a state only face orders from one authority (the state), actors in a peacebuilding context are subject to orders from two institutions (the domestic state institutions and the peacebuilding mission). This establishes a duality of power structures in the peacebuilding context, which moves questions of interaction center-stage. Rather than to treat these powers as parallel, the article shows that “in reality, ‘the local’ and ‘the international’ must be viewed within a complex web of interlocking ties” (Mac Ginty 2011, p. 90). A power structure is understood as an institution that issues relevant orders for an actor and can back these up using different power mechanisms to ensure compliance. In this article, the local power structure is the local police organization including the ministry of interior which governs the police. The international power structure is the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), which was deployed from 2003 to 2012.
	This article explores the interaction of orders given by these dual power structures and their effect on local police officers’ compliance or resistance. Local police officers receive orders for compliance from both their local police organization and EUPM. The article shows that whether the interaction between EUPM and the local police organization were positive, or whether it was competitive determined whether the orders the police officers received from the two institutions were mutually supportive or contradictory. The nature of the two power structures’ interactions therefore has a direct effect on the compliance or resistance of individual local police officers; compliance is more likely if both organizations have positive relations and their orders are mutually supportive, while contradictory orders force the individual officer to resist one of the institutions. As the empirical analysis shows, in cases of contradictory orders it is almost always the local power of the police organization that trumps and EUPM that is resisted. The focus is hence not on inter-institutional interaction in general, but on how the nature of these interactions, positive or competitive, influences compliance or resistance choices by individual police officers.  
This article demonstrates that it is not sufficient to understand local and international power in peacebuilding in isolation, but that the nature of their interaction impacts individual-level compliance or resistance choices. Specifically, it analyzes the example of the police restructuring process in BiH and shows the impact that the nature of local-international interaction had on the compliance or resistance of individual police officers with this process. While existing studies shine light on police restructuring from the perspective of local resistance and the rationale for this (Berg, 2014; Flessenkemper, 2012; Juncos, 2011, 2017; Vandemoortele, 2012), this article contributes a micro-level analysis which focuses on the importance and explanatory power of the nature of interaction for individual police officers. 
This article first provides a theoretical power framework that explains local police officers’ compliance choices faced with orders from two power structures–the local police organization and EUPM. The power structures can either support one another and make for better local compliance with orders that both agree on, or they can undermine one another in which case local police officers are faced with contradictory orders. The nature of this interaction, supportive or contradictory, hence influences local compliance choices. Second, the article shows that local and international power are not in fact equal or balanced. Contrary to much of the existing literature, which assumes a power advantage of the international mission, this article demonstrates the dominant position of the local police (Sending, 2011). It also highlights the variation of the relevance of the three power mechanisms between the two case studies. Finally, the article details the consequences of the local domination of power and the process of interaction for the sustainability of EU police reforms in BiH. 
This article analyzes EUPM, specifically, its actions pertaining to the police reform process in BiH between 2004 and 2008. Data for the empirical analysis stems from the academic literature and policy reports on BiH and EUPM. Over 50 face-to-face interviews with local police officers and ministry of interior staff were conducted in October 2013. In the Federation of BiH (one part of BiH) these centered around the geographical areas of Sarajevo, Mostar, and Gorazde, while in the Republika Srpska (RS) permission for interviews was only granted for the ministry of interior in Banja Luka. Some unofficial interviews were also conducted with officers in Banja Luka. While the empirical data are not representative due to the small size of the sample, efforts were made to make it as diverse as possible in terms of ethnic and geographical representation. All interviews were conducted and are cited here under strict anonymity. Interviews consisted of a legitimacy questionnaire constructed of statements measuring legitimacy’s output and procedural dimension. 


Power in international peacebuilding

Peacebuilding operations constitute institutions of authority for the local elites and, at times, the local population. This reality demands an explicit analysis of the role of power in the processes and outcomes of interaction in peacebuilding. This article understands power to be based on three different mechanisms: coercion, inducement, and legitimacy. It is the interaction between the local and international power structures (which each have the same three mechanisms at their disposal) that is the focus of this article. It is important to note in this respect, that EUPM can give direct orders to local police officers. Due to the institutional set-up of police reform, co-locating international EUPM officers with local officers at different ranks, there is a direct line of command from EUPM to the local police. 
The literature on political science and international relations conceptualizes and operationalizes power in different ways. Barnett and Duvall (2005) envision power along two axes: diffuse versus direct and interactional versus constitutional power. They hence construct a matrix of four types of power they call: compulsory (direct and interactional), institutional (diffuse and interactional), structural (direct and constitutional), and productive power (diffuse and constitutional) (2005, p. 48). This article uses the concept of “compulsory power,” because it is relational between two actors (or institutions) and direct (in the form of overt orders for reform), which comes closest to the relations between individual police officers and the orders they receive from the police organization and EUPM. 
Barnett and Duvall (2005) recognize that compulsory power can work through different mechanisms. The article follows this differentiation of power mechanisms to enable nuanced analysis of the power expanded by the local police organization and EUPM. For the analysis coercion is understood as the power of threats, inducement as the power of rewards, and legitimacy as the power of appropriate and justified behavior. 
Coercion is the power of threats in which compliance results from an institution’s threats of negative consequences for non-compliance. Actors comply because they fear punishment. The more credible the threat of punishment and the more targeted the punishment, the greater the chance that compliance will occur (Young, 1979). This means that the likelihood of compliance with coercive threats depends on the institutional structure of the authority issuing the threat. 
Inducement is the power of rewards and compliance results from the promise of a positive incentive for the actor. Actors comply because they want to gain something. The more enticing the benefit and the more targeted the benefit, the more likely the actor will comply (Hurd, 2007). The likelihood of compliance with inducements depends on the institutional capacity and resources of the authority issuing the inducement. Coercion and inducement are rational-choice mechanisms in that the actor, who is coerced or induced, makes his decision based on a rational decision-making model. If the threat or inducement outweigh the cost of compliance, compliance will occur. If the cost of compliance outweighs the benefit or the threat, compliance will not occur (Elster, 1986). However, both mechanisms also have a structural condition, they only work effectively if the institution making the compliance demand has the structural capacity to use the mechanisms properly; monitoring compliance levels to punish non-compliance and understanding and being able to offer required incentives. 
Legitimacy is the final power mechanism. In Weber’s words legitimacy means 

to influence the conduct of one or more others (the ruled) … in such a way that their conduct to a socially relevant degree occurs as if the ruled had made the content of the command the maxim of their conduct for its very own sake (Weber, 1978, p. 946).
 
Unlike coercion and inducement, legitimacy does not depend on the institution’s structure or capacity for success–it requires an internal normative evaluation process. As this article explores the subjective perceptions of actors towards authorities, the understanding of legitimacy follows Beetham’s (1991) approach to analyzing “legitimacy-in-context” (p. 14). Accordingly, legitimacy is based on normative conventions of a given community or society. The community’s normative conventions need to match those of the institution claiming legitimacy; an institution claims legitimacy and the receiving actors decide whether to accept these claims on the basis of whether they mirror their particular normative conventions (Clark, 2005). Each actor holds individual normative beliefs which influence his legitimacy perceptions but equally each actor is also part of relevant social groups and communities holding collective normative beliefs, which may also influence an actor’s perceptions. As the below empirical analysis will show, it is difficult to separate individual and collective beliefs for any actor. Legitimacy is here viewed as a social relationship between the ruler and ruled. Hurd defines it as “a subjective quality, relational between actor and institution, and is defined by the actor’s perception of the institution” (Hurd, 2007, p. 7). 
	The relevance of these three power mechanisms for peacebuilding has been analyzed in detail elsewhere (Gippert, 2015, 2017). For this article, it is most relevant to consider that each institution of authority analyzed uses each of these three mechanisms with the aim of ensuring compliance from the individual local police officers in BiH. For local police officers, there are hence two authorities issuing orders and instructions and these orders can either agree with or contradict one another. In case one, EUPM and the local police organizations’ orders are in agreement, the local police officer who receives these orders, complies because the order is supported by both authorities. In case two, EUPM and the police organization’s orders contradict one another, and the police officer has to decide which one to follow. In this case, the stronger or more meaningful authority will prevail.

Figure 1 here

International compliance requests based on inducement or coercion are evaluated by the local actor as to their cost-benefit ratio. If the international reform request promises a reward that outweighs the cost (this can simply be the cost of doing things differently) or if the threat of non-compliance outweighed the cost, compliance would ensue. If the costs are not outweighed, the actor would be likely to resist. However, this calculation is crucially influenced by the position of the local police organization on the matter on which compliance is demanded. It is hence not only the threat or benefit EUPM promises in return for (non) compliance the actor considers, but also the consequence of his actions as viewed by the local police organization. Compliance requests that entail action which matches the interests and orders of the local police are likely to be complied with as it means the two structures reinforce one another. However, if compliance requests of EUPM contradict local orders or challenge local power structures, the actor is forced to decide which order to follow. In such a scenario, international and local power are in opposition and it depends on their respective institutional capacity and legitimacy with which the local actor complies. 
In order for legitimacy to influence compliance, local actors have to view their normative conventions as matching those of the mission, and be acting upon the internal moral obligation this engenders. Legitimacy does not automatically lead to compliance as actors can also choose to act against their internal “compliance pull” (Hurd, 2007). Even if local actors do view international operations as legitimate and they feel a compliance pull towards a given request, they also consider the stance of their local police organization on the matter of the request. This can either mean a contest of legitimacies in the head of the local actor, if local and international power structures disagree on a behavioural request. In this case, the stronger match of normative conventions and institutional aims, actions, and objectives wins. This could then mean that local police officers who perceive EUPM as more legitimate than their own police force would decide to follow EUPM’s orders against the recommendation of their own police force. In reality, though, this does not tend to happen as local officers are concerned about the impact on their careers if they act against decisions by their police chain of command. In that case, a rational-choice deliberation proceeds on the basis of what threats and promises the local police organization holds in stock for the actor in case of compliance with the international request. This means that local legitimacy may not in fact lead to local compliance in case of opposition to the request by the local police organization because the coercion or inducement power of the local power structure cuts the connection between local legitimacy and local compliance with the international request. In sum, a contest of legitimacies may favour the legitimacy of EUPM but even if that is the case, local officers are for career reasons unlikely to comply with EUPM if their local police force is set against EUPM reforms. This shows the important observation from the legitimacy literature that even strong legitimacy may not lead to compliance. This does not invalidate the importance of legitimacy as a compliance pull nor does it suggest legitimacy is always trumped by rational-choice considerations. The following analysis of police reform in the Republika Srpska, the Serb entity of BiH shows the latter dynamic. It is also possible that local and international legitimacy converge due to matching normative conventions. This would mean they reinforce one another and lead to strong compliance. The case of police reform in the Federation of BiH illustrates this scenario.


Police reform in BiH

Police reform was an integral part of the international community’s support for post-war BiH and it included several international institutions and a period of over 15 years (1996-2012). Immediately after the war, the International Police Training Force (IPTF) was sent to BiH as part of the Dayton peace agreement (GFAP, 1995). IPTF reduced the ethnic police forces in size, vetted all officers for war crimes records, and started to train officers according to international standards of policing (Palmer, 2004). EUPM was deployed in January 2003. It took over from IPTF to bring the Bosnian police “closer to EU standards” (Council of the European Union, 2002). The mission closed down in June 2012. This article focuses on a particular instance of police reform in BiH: the police restructuring process that lasted roughly from 2004 to 2008. This process aimed at finding a more effective structure for the ethnically-separated and ineffective police. As the article is interested in the interaction between the local police organization and EUPM, it focuses on this interaction rather than the details of the underwhelming outcomes of the restructuring process (for a detailed analysis of the police restructuring process see Juncos, 2011, 2017; Knaus & Bender, 2007; Mühlmann, 2008a; International Crisis Group, 2005). 
	EUPM followed a so-called “programmatic approach,” which meant the mission operationalized the vague mandate by translating its aims and objectives into seven programs, and each program was constituted of multiple actions (PPIO, 2003). Each action was implemented by local Bosnian officers, who had been assigned international counterparts. This system of co-locating international and local officers was to ensure a cooperative reform process in which EUPM and local police staff worked closely together on all the actions that each of EUPM’s reforms required. The local police officers, who implemented the reforms, therefore received instructions from both EUPM and the local police organization as to how (and whether) EUPM’s reforms should be implemented. EUPM and the local police organization hence interacted with one another throughout the reform process. Interaction took place on a day-to-day basis through the co-location of local and international officers at middle and higher ranks, and the regular contact between EUPM’s and the police organization’s senior staff in the various mixed bodies that oversaw the reform process.  EUPM had a non-executive mandate to “monitor, mentor and inspect” the local police. While this is a cooperative framework, it is important to acknowledge the power underlying this process as “correct” behavior corresponding to European standards, reforms, and processes that required compliance were passed from EUPM to the local police. This article uses the term “orders” to capture these various requirements and instructions made by EUPM to the local police. 
The Office of the High Representative (OHR), which represented the international community, is another key international institution in BiH. It is tasked with overseeing the implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace agreement (OHR, 2015). The High Representative (HR) had wide-reaching executive powers which meant he could dismiss elected officials if they were held to obstruct the implementation of the peace agreement and promulgated laws if he deemed the parliament had failed to do so (Knaus & Martin, 2003). From 2002, the HR became also the EU Special Representative (EUSR) in a so-called “double-hatting” arrangement, but the EUSR ‘hat’ was often neglected, especially but Lord Ashdown.
Police reform in BiH also became linked to the wider Bosnian EU integration process when the European Commission’s Feasibility Study of November 2003, which detailed the reforms BiH had to undergo before it could sign a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU, included police reform on the list of areas requiring attention. A Functional Review by the European Commission in June 2004 stated that reform of the police was key to ensure their ability to function and suggested three possible models for reform: a state-centered single police force; an entity-based approach; or a cantonal model (International Centre for Migration Policy Development, 2004). Despite having dedicated police missions in the country (first IPTF and then EUPM), HR Lord Ashdown made police restructuring one of his main aims to achieve during his term (2002-2006) (Mühlmann, 2008a). He decided in July 2004 that only a state-centric model of policing would be right for BiH and used his executive power to form a Police Restructuring Commission (PRC).  The police restructuring process happened in addition to EUPM’s work but was closely aligned with EUPM. EUPM assisted the OHR legal department prior to the forming of the PRC regarding the possibilities of structural changes to the police, a working group of EUPM supported the PRC, and the head of EUPM was a full member of the PRC (Merlingen & Ostrauskaite 2006a, p. 56). In the eyes of the local parties, EUPM became fully associated with the process (Interviews with Bosnian police, 2013). While this article focuses more on EUPM’s reforms than the details of the police restructuring process, the above shows that it is impossible to keep these areas entirely apart.

International Power in BiH

EUPM and the OHR (double-hatted as EUSR), brought different power mechanisms to bear on BiH’s political and police leadership to ensure their compliance with EUPM’s reforms and the police restructuring process. EUPM derived its source legitimacy from three different organizations. First, EUPM was mandated by the United Nations Security Council.  Second, it was a tool of the EU, the most powerful regional organization in the Western Balkans. Third, EUPM had formally been invited by the national parliament in BiH. Two other relevant elements of the mission’s legitimacy are based on the way it exercises its authority and treats local actors (procedural legitimacy) and the progress it makes in achieving reforms considered desirable by the local society (output legitimacy) (Scharpf, 1999; Zaum, 2013). As elaborated before, whether the mission’s claims to legitimacy as based on these elements is recognized and accepted by the local police officers, depends on their match with local normative conventions, as the following case studies show.	In addition to these sources of legitimacy, important incentives were provided in terms of the wider aims of BiH to accede the EU. Access to funds through the European Commission-led pre-accession Stability and Association Process (SAP) offered impressive financial benefits. Under the EU’s Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development, and Stabilization Program (CARDS), 4.65 billion Euros were distributed to the Western Balkans states between 2000 and 2006 (EUR-Lex, 2007). Through the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA, since 2014 IPA II), BiH received 609.6 million Euro for 2007-2013, and 165.8 million Euro for 2014-2017 (European Commission, 2016). These payments came with conditions. They required BiH to sign the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), for which police reform was a requirement. Additional incentives were offered by EUPM through the training and equipment for the local police. These were also conditional on compliance with EUPM’s reforms, including strengthening policing at the central state level. EUPM also provided equipment and organized transport or training for the local police to improve capacity, resources, and communication and cooperation between forces (Interviews with Bosnian police, 2013).  
While EUPM did not have executive powers, it was agreed that in case the mission faced recalcitrant officers, the EUPM Head of Mission could report to the OHR to have officers removed from their posts (Mühlmann, 2008b). This provided EUPM informally with derived coercive power. Although EUPM could employ these different power mechanisms, the case studies show that they were not used consistently across the cases analyzed and that both their usage and local reactions to them varied significantly in terms of compliance and resistance.  

Local Power of the Bosnian Police

The Bosnian police are hierarchically structured into different ranks. Orders to lower-ranked officers are binding and non-compliance with a lawful order is a disciplinary offense (misconduct). In the Western Balkans more generally, this hierarchy is compounded by respect for authority and seniority, further improving the likelihood of compliance with orders of the police chain of command (Interviews with Bosnian police, 2013). Non-compliance with orders is legally valid if an order is not lawful, however, it takes courage to stand up to a senior officer and refuse compliance. Normally, the police federation, the police’s union, should protect officers from negative consequences of the chain of command in case of grounded non-compliance (like with an unlawful order). However, in BiH the police federation is weak and officers interviewed made it very clear that non-compliance with chain of command orders is not an option (Interviews with Bosnian police, 2013). This shows the strong coercive potential of the local police organization.
	Officers can rise through the ranks and be put in charge of subordinates or departments if their conduct and actions merit promotion. This provides an important incentive for local officers to follow orders and keep their superiors satisfied.	Promotion promises material incentives through higher salaries but also non-material ones such as increased status and respect shown to higher ranks. 
Many officers join the police because they agree with the basic idea of upholding law and order and enforcing the rule of law; “working for a better Bosnia” or a “better police” as some interviewees stated (Interviews with Bosnian Police, 2013). Each police force has its own normative conventions about processes, behavior and what can and cannot be done (Fielding, 1995). In BiH some interviewees referred to this normative set of beliefs within the police as being a “guide” and being considered good and right, while others disagreed with how the police does certain things (often dealings with minorities) and considered the “moral compass” of their police to be “broken” (interview with Bosnian Police, 2013). It was therefore not always the case that police officers agreed with the normative conventions of their own police. Those who agreed with them came to see the local police as legitimate, and followed orders not because of a cost-benefit calculation, but because they consider it the right thing to do. For those who did not agree with these norms, the regular salary provided an alternative reason to join and remain. 

Interaction in the Federation of BiH: positive and supportive 

Due to the division of BiH into two entities (the Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation of BiH), it was the political elites of the respective ministry of interior, the senior police command, and the police middle-management of each entity (and in the Federation each canton) with which EUPM and the OHR cooperated. In the Federation of BiH these aims and objective met largely with support. The Bosniak community, which counts for just over 50% of the population (Agency for Statistics Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2016), supported the aims of EUPM and the OHR to centralize the police and move policing authority to the central state level. This is because these aims match the Bosniak community’s vision of BiH as one centralized strong state, rather than a decentralized one. This is also a strategic aim as the majority status of the Bosniak community would invariably mean they could control state-level politics. Many Bosniaks view the mere existence of the RS as the result of the methods of ethnic cleansing and forced population removals used by the Serb militias and the Serb army during the war (Mühlmann, 2008a). 
Speaking to police commanders in Sarajevo and Gorazde, both Bosniak-majority cantons, revealed that EUPM had not been considered coercive. The mission and its staff were described as “collegial” and “friendly,” the senior police ranks as well as the lower ranks explained that EUPM had been an advisory presence only, they had not threatened the local police to do anything or tried to push through reforms (Interviews with Bosnian police, 2013). The commissioner for Gorazde explained that IPTF had used threats and their executive powers to push reforms but EUPM had had a very different approach. The only coercive power the local police officers mentioned, was that of the local police organization’s chain of command. Disregarding orders from a local superior had “serious consequences” for any officers, particularly in light of the weakness of the police federation, meant to protect officers from arbitrary dismissal (Interviews with Bosnian police, 2013). Chain of command orders were followed without question. Since EUPM’s reforms were supported by the police organization of the Federation, their orders worked in support of EUPM’s reforms. The power of the local police organization ensured that EUPM’s reforms would be followed, making EUPM coercion unnecessary. 
The same applied to the use of inducement powers by the operation. While the officers, especially the senior ranks, were aware that EUPM, as an institution of the EU, was a step towards EU accession and eventual membership, this promise was too far removed from their daily lives to affect compliance. At the same time, many were aware that the equipment and resources provided by EUPM were an asset to the local police. However, they were not seen as an incentive towards compliance, because compliance was already seen to be in the local police’s interest (perspective of senior command) and the senior police management had ordered this compliance (perspective of lower ranks) (Interviews with Bosnian police, 2013). The resources and training EUPM provided were considered good and useful but not as a means of power because compliance was not being questioned. The inducement power of the local police organization, however, was relevant for many lower ranked officers. They explained that good work and compliance with chain of command orders was a way to be noticed and rewarded through promotion. So, for the local officers of the lower ranks, inducement had been a consideration for good compliance, but it had been the inducement power of the local chain of command, not that of EUPM (Interviews with Bosnian police, 2013).
The Bosniak officers generally held high perceptions of legitimacy towards EUPM. The match of Bosniaks’ normative conventions and EUPM’s reforms were particularly marked in the output elements of legitimacy; Bosniak officers found EUPM’s values were important for BiH, that the reforms matched the police’s needs, and that progress on these reforms was good. For the procedural legitimacy elements, most Bosniak officers agreed that the mission had been responsive to their input and that the EUPM staff were respectful and professional. Also, EUPM’s source legitimacy as being invited by the state assembly was recognized (Gippert, 2016; Interviews with Bosnian police, 2013). This match of local normative benchmarks with EUPM’s reforms and aims explains the high legitimacy perceptions of the officers. As the local police organization supported EUPM’s reforms, these legitimacy perceptions did not clash with local orders. Hence, local actors did not need to decide which legitimate organization to follow, which meant local legitimacy towards EUPM could hence contribute to compliance with EUPM’s reforms.
This match of normative views and strategic aims of the Bosniak community with EUPM and OHR’s reforms to strengthen state level policing and to restructure the police, meant that international compliance requests were mirrored by the Federation ministry of interior and the police management of the Bosniak cantons. International coercion and inducement were not necessary as interests aligned and meant that the Bosniak community supported EUPM’s reforms of strengthening the state-level institutions of the State Information and Protection Agency (SIPA) and the State Border Service (SBS). Bosniaks also supported the proposal put forward by EUPM for police restructuring, which envisioned five police regions decided on the basis of a number of technical criteria and the establishment of a state-level Ministry of Security (International Crisis Group, 2005, p. 7). This proposal would mean policing areas that cut across entity lines, abolishing the entity ministries of interior, and moving policing authority to the state level at the expense of the entities. In the power struggle between the international institutions and the RS that police restructuring turned into, the Bosniak community aligned with the OHR and EUPM, only showing dissatisfaction and resistance when the proposals kept being watered down to meet Serb concerns (Mühlmann, 2008a).
The above analysis showed that local power structures had been considered more relevant to local actors’ compliance behavior than those of EUPM. However, because the local police organization’s aims and objectives aligned with those of EUPM, both institutions reinforced one another which initially led to good compliance. This case is hence an example of the two authorities’ powers being used in a mutually supportive manner which had a positive impact on individual officer’s compliance. Why this reinforced compliance did finally not lead to an outcome in police restructuring that was desired by the Bosniak and the international community, is explored in the following section.

Interaction in the RS: competitive and contradictory 

The leadership of the RS was quick to point out the contradiction between EUPM’s and OHR’s demands for police restructuring/centralization and the Bosnian constitution as based on the General Framework Agreement for Peace. While the constitution assigns policing powers to the entities, the OHR and EUPM’s aims for police centralization envisioned policing power to pass to the central-state level, which would require a change of the constitution. The RS vehemently resisted the police restructuring process and any EUPM reforms that strengthened state-level policing, pointing to the constitutional right of the RS to be in charge of its own policing and the importance of this as a vital security guarantee for Serbs to live in a majority-Bosniak state (Mühlmann, 2008a). Serbs comprise about 30% of the population in BiH (Agency for Statistics Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2016), and the existence of the RS means they are the majority in their own entity rather than the minority in a centralized Bosnian state.
	The Croat community only numbers about 14% of the population (Agency for Statistics Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2016) but the cantonal division of the police along ethnic lines mean Croat officers are in charge of majority-Croat cantons in the Federation. The Croat elites did not support the centralization of the police but wanted to keep policing at the entity level. They saw policing at the entity level as crucial to ensure the security of their communities. If any restructuring were to happen, Croats favored a “three entities” approach, in order for their community to be granted their own entity (Juncos, 2011, p. 371). The Croat community did, however, support EUPM’s aims of strengthening the local police and increasing their capacity, a (low) common denominator with the Bosniak community. In the matter of police reform and restructuring, Croats could rely on the vocal Serbs to defend entity powers.
The Serb stance towards entity-level powers of policing was vehemently expressed in interviews with the ministry of interior in Banja Luka. Even the reforms of EUPM to strengthen the state-level institutions of SIPA and the SBS were considered “imposed” and “not matching local needs” (Interviews with ministry of interior staff, 2013). EUPM was described as coercive as it tried to push through reforms to which the RS objected. The senior police command and the ministry of interior staff were well-aware of the link between EUPM and the OHR, as EUPM had relied on the OHR to help it enforce compliance (EUPM, 2004). The use of coercive threats by EUPM backed up by the OHR led to a clash with the local power structures, which remained diametrically opposed to any police reforms which weakened the centralized entity power (Berg, 2014). 
With the top of the local police organization (the ministry of interior) set against many of EUPM’s reforms (including against reforms to which the ministry had formally consented), the local police enforced throughout its ranks a non-compliance policy with EUPM. Speaking to lower ranked officers revealed that international coercive power was perceived but not considered as relevant as that of the local chain of command; “we are not scared of EUPM,” “you do what chain of command tells you” (Interviews with Bosnian Police, 2013). As one officer explained, EUPM can fire officers with the help of the OHR but this is unusual to happen to lower ranked officers. The orders from the police organization though were seen as absolute, and non-compliance with these would have had immediate consequences for the officers. 
Local officers did not dare oppose chain of command orders to work with EUPM, which led to non-compliance with EUPM. Sustained pressure from the OHR on behalf of EUPM at the top level of the RS police and ministry of interior led to some compliance, for instance with the initially resisted reform on community policing. Even this reform had been resisted as it required a delegation of power from the center to dedicated community police officers and the community. The RS refused to implement community policing until the OHR threatened to dismiss recalcitrant officers and even then, compliance was superficial and was stopped as soon as EUPM observation lessened (Gippert, 2016). This shows the limitations of international coercion in the face of entrenched local power set against the international orders. 
EUPM as an institution of the EU represented the promise of eventual EU membership and the economic perks that come not only with membership but already with the Stabilization and Association Process. The pre-accession funding and the progress towards political integration (and with that visa liberalization) were the carrots the EU used to induce compliance with reforms, including police restructuring. Particularly signing the SAA, and with that accessing new funds, was used as an incentive to get the RS to comply with the required reforms. However, these incentives were not enough to overcome the entrenched resistance of the RS leadership. As Juncos (2011, p. 381) points out, the eventual promise of rewards did not outweigh the cost of losing the entity powers and with that control over policing. The EU had not calculated that the RS leadership would choose the continued existence of the RS over EU membership if push came to shove (Juncos, 2011). 
Unsurprisingly, the level of legitimacy towards EUPM by ministry of interior staff and senior police staff interviewed was very low. The lack of responsiveness of the mission to local concerns was the main procedural element on which Serb perceptions were based. Also, the output elements of a mis-match of EUPM’s reform aims with local needs contributed to low legitimacy perceptions (Gippert 2016; Interviews with Bosnian police, 2013). Interestingly, even EUPM’s source legitimacy, the consent of the Bosnian state for EUPM’s deployment, was questioned. Serb officers explained that EUPM “should have asked permission from the [RS] national assembly,” not the state assembly (Interviews with Bosnian police, 2013). This shows that host state consent is only relevant if the state as such is considered legitimate. 
However, speaking to some lower ranked RS officers showed a different picture. Several officers held very positive attitudes towards EUPM and their reforms and voiced criticism of the RS police leadership and the tight grip the ministry of interior held over the local police. EUPM reforms were seen as a possibility to “bring some independence from politics” into policing and to strengthen the capacity of the local police (Interviews with Bosnian police, 2013). These officers also held high legitimacy perceptions of EUPM, stressing in particular the match of reforms with the needs of BiH, exactly the criterion the ministry of interior staff had questioned. These officers professed a conflict in that they actually considered the reform of EUPM legitimate and good but were forced by the local police organization to counter-act them. They explained that they had also not complied with EUPM’s reforms, despite a compliance pull, because they had been worried about sanctions from the chain of command (Interviews with Bosnian police, 2013). This case shows the effects of power competition and contradiction between the two authorities, which require local officers to decide which order to follow. The local police organization was in a stronger position for compliance which undermined EUPM and OHR reforms. This section also shows the heterogeneous nature of the RS police with some lower ranked officers supportive of EUPM’s reforms while their superiors resisted and rejected EUPM’s work, demonstrating the importance of micro-level analysis. 

Conclusion

The findings of the article highlight the consequences of the nature of interaction between EUPM and the police organization (supportive or contradictory) for individual police officers’ compliance or resistance choices. The ethnic divisions that still run deep in BiH determined the stance of the different ethnic communities on police reform and police restructuring, showing the heterogeneity of “local actors.” Police reform was hence politicized considerably, and while never a technical exercise anyway, meant that even moderate reforms by EUPM were evaluated as to their potential meaning for future policing powers. The OHR’s police restructuring process, within which EUPM got caught up, drew the international institutions into the existing local power struggles between the three ethnic groups in their competing visions for BiH’s future and the locus of power in the state. This illustrates the difficulty for international institutions to retain independence and impartiality in messy and complex peacebuilding environments (Pouligny, 2006, p. 135). The following three findings are drawn from the specific case of EUPM in BiH but are relevant at core to peacebuilding more generally. This does not mean this article generalizes but simply that it discovered behavioral patterns and outcomes which can also apply to other peacebuilding cases.
First, the analysis shows that the local police chain of command’s coercive and inducement power was stronger and more meaningful to local actors’ behavioral choices than that of the international institutions. Despite OHR’s considerable powers, it was the coercive and inducement power of the local chain of command that prevailed in any clashes of authority with EUPM. This is, as observed elsewhere (Gippert, 2016), understandable from the local perspective as the chain of command’s power is more lasting, more immediate, and more relevant to local police officers’ careers and futures. Similarly, the ability of the RS to withstand the immense pressure of the OHR and the EU to accept the police restructuring plan, even in a watered-down version, shows the strength of entrenched local power structures and their ability to alter peacebuilding objectives. This finding supports those publications which point at the strength and importance of local power in peacebuilding, as the introduction to this issue highlights (Ejdus & Juncos, 2017). 
The wider relevance of this finding beyond this immediate case is based on the similarity of particular features of local power: the coercive and inductive power of local power, the normative meaning local power has in the wider local community (not always but often), the temporary nature of international intervention, and the need of the mission to at least pay lip-service to the concept of local ownership which limits the ability to impose reforms. Furthermore, the article also showed variation of the exercise, and local perception, of the relevance of the different power mechanisms across the case studies. Whether EUPM was perceived as legitimate or coercive differed between the Federation and the RS, showing the importance of detailed micro-level analysis.
Second, the analysis finds that local actor’s legitimacy perceptions towards EUPM did not necessarily translate into compliance with EUPM’s orders. In the Bosniak case, where local and international orders coincided, as did normative beliefs about police reform, local legitimacy did support compliance. However, in the RS, even lower ranked officers who did hold high legitimacy attitudes towards EUPM did not comply with EU orders because they were concerned with counter-acting their chain of command’s orders. This finding adds nuance to the literature advocating the importance of local actors’ legitimacy for the outcomes of peacebuilding operations (Mersiades, 2005; Whalan, 2013). It shows that legitimacy does not automatically translate into compliance but that the structural power of the chain of command can undercut legitimacy’s potential to lead to compliance. Local legitimacy is hence not sufficient to engender local actors’ compliance, it also needs to not be in contradiction to meaningful local power structures. This finding does not decide the debate on rational-choice versus normative power mechanisms in favor of the first, but shows the importance for detailed micro-level analysis to determine which power mechanisms matter; a matter of importance beyond this case.
Finally, for the practice of peacebuilding, it is hence important not to place local actors into a position in which mission reforms contradict local power structure’s orders or aims – hence counteracting the very legitimacy that could support local compliance. The no longer secret recipe of local ownership is key to this problem (see Ejdus, 2017), as ironically the original European Commission study noted in their suggestions for police restructuring (International Centre for Migration Policy Development, 2004). Lord Ashdown and the EU underestimated the RS’ potential to resist and miscalculated the power local actors could wield. This is relevant beyond this particular case as for instance examples of UNTAC in Cambodia and some African peacebuilding efforts also show the limitations of international peacebuilding in the face on entrenched local resistance (Englebert & Tull, 2008; Pouligny, 2006). The international community, far from being more powerful, was unable to push through reforms against entrenched local power structures showing that international peacebuilding requires positive interaction and cooperation. 
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